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Abstract 
The adversarial nature of custody disputes poses risks for the involved children. 
Children to parents with a long-lasting, high-intensity conflict have been shown to 
suffer more than children involved in a peaceful separation. Means of successful 
mediation between parents in a custody dispute are therefore warranted. Reducing 
the total time between separation and court ruling is also warranted, as children 
suffer from uncertainty and low stability. The Equality Principle (EP) is a 
theoretical construct stemming from research in the fields of game theory and goal-
setting theory. The EP can reduce the time requirements of custody disputes by 
introducing the threat of randomizing the outcome when parents can not come to an 
agreement. It can also serve to increase each parent’s offer of visitation time, by 
tying those offers to the outcome of the dispute. In this study the EP was tested 
experimentally as a means to increase cooperation between parents through the use 
of vignettes. In a within-subjects design experiment with 52 Swedish-speaking 
participants, offers of visitation time was measured in two conditions, represented 
by two different decision scenarios. The results show that participants offer higher 
amounts of visitation time in a decision scenario based on the EP than in one based 
on the present system. This study concludes that the EP shows promise in terms of 
being implemented as a tool to increase cooperation between litigating parents. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In families with a high level of long-lasting interparental conflict, parents put their 
children at risk for various issues related to their well-being. Separation is not 
uncommon in such cases, which can lead to a dispute about child custody. In this 
article, a custody dispute is defined as a judicial dispute concerning either custody, 
living or visitation. Custody evaluators are defined as the units assigned by the 
authorities responsible for investigations in custody disputes. Family court is 
defined as the social service unit that provides the court with recommendations 
based on the findings of these investigations. In custody disputes, where conflicts 
between parents are frequent, their children are prone to suffering anxiety, 
insecurity and depression among other health issues (Bergman & Rejmer, 2017).  
 
In Sweden, 7327 custody disputes were settled in county courts in 2018. This is an 
increase of more than 150% from the 2909 settled disputes in 2006 (Swedish 
National Courts Administration, 2006, 2018). Common in all these cases is the 
suffering of affected children. Children whose parents go through with a divorce 
following conflict are prone to stress and feelings of grief (Mcintosh, 2003). 
Children exposed to a high level of interparental conflict are also prone to mental 
health problems and long-lasting implications for their adjustment following 
divorce. However, peaceful divorces reduce exposure to high parental conflict and 
may lead to amelioration of the children's possible future mental health problems 
(Lansford, 2009). The well-being of a child is tied both to the intensity of the 
conflict between parents and the number of stressful events a child is exposed to. 
Exposing a child to high-intensity conflicts or many stressful events, including life 
changes, decreases the child’s well-being (Amato, 1993; Emery, 1999). A Swedish 
archive study in which 33 court acts were analyzed showed that 34 out of 57 
children in high-conflict divorces had health problems around the time of the court 
negotiations (Bergman & Rejmer, 2017). Anxiety, fear, insecurity, sleeping 
problems, nightmares and depression were the most common psychological issues. 
Common physical issues reported among the children in the reviewed material are 
headache, stomachache, recurring fevers and other signs of disease (Bergman & 
Rejmer, 2017). Consequently, if high-conflict divorces cannot be resolved before 
court negotiations, in many cases the damage to affected children has already been 
done. 
 
In these cases, the decision making of the involved authorities should be in 
accordance with Swedish law. Above all else, the risk of maltreatment must be 
considered. Concerning custody, it is stated that the child’s best interest should be 
decisive for all decisions regarding custody, living and visitation rights. The law 
also emphasizes the importance of a close and good contact with both parents (SFS 
1949:381).  
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1.2 Investigations in custody disputes 
In Sweden, like in many other countries, parents can sue each other for custody if 
they cannot come to an agreement about the custody of their children after 
separation. In these cases, a custody evaluation is initiated by government assigned 
units to establish what is best for the child in that situation. Custody evaluations 
include investigations concerning custody, living and visitation. The evaluations 
are conducted by the social service, and courts make legal rulings based on 
recommendations and findings of the investigations (Ngaosuvan, 2018b). 
Suggestions regarding such investigations, court decisions as well as general 
information about investigations are provided by the government authority Family 
Law and Parental Support Authority (Family Law and Parental Support Authority, 
2018). One part of the investigation is the risk assessment (RA), which determines 
whether either of the parents pose a risk of maltreating the child, which would 
make that parent unfit for custody. In the RA investigators focus their attention on 
parental risk factors, emphasizing criminal history, drug use, maltreatment, mental 
illness and other factors that may be associated with a high risk of child 
maltreatment in the future. A parent that is deemed unfit in the risk assessment will 
not be awarded custody. Another part of the custody evaluation is the investigation 
for the child’s best interest (ICBI). During the ICBI other factors are considered 
that may not put the child in risk of maltreatment but might still affect the child’s 
well-being. One such factor is stability, as minimizing the child’s sense of loss is a 
key point in the assessment of the child’s best interest (Schiratzki, 2008, p. 92). 
Stability can refer to circumstances relating to housing situation or proximity to 
school and friends. 
 
Conflicts that cannot be resolved using the RA as grounds for a decision tend to get 
prolonged as the differences found in the ICBI can often be described as the 
“splitting of hairs”, that is, not important enough differences to select one parent 
for custody over the other (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). These prolonged conflicts 
negatively influence the children involved by not providing them the security of 
knowing where they will live and how their daily life will be managed. In such 
cases, both parents might be considered fit by the RA and ICBI but the conflict 
itself is causing harm to the child. A swift resolution to the conflict would in these 
cases improve the child’s well-being (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). The court must make a 
ruling in such a case, and the issue is that the ruling might be based on information 
that is irrelevant to the child (Saunders, Tolman & Faller, 2013). Any factor that a 
court finds in favor of a particular parent can be weighed arbitrarily more than 
other equally relevant factors, for example which parent had the highest amount of 
parental leave during the child’s first year (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). In this way courts 
run the risk of selecting a, to the child, irrelevant factor and making their judgment 
based on that factor as there is no other evident way to resolve the dispute. Another 
risk is that courts favor even more detailed investigations to find even the slightest 
differences in parent fitness, prolonging the time the investigations take and 
effectively making the resolution of the dispute a more important goal than the 
child’s well-being (Ngaosuvan, 2018a).  
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1.3 Game theory 
Game theory is defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and 
cooperation between intelligent and rational decision-makers (Myerson, 1997). 
These models attempt to explain situations in which decision-makers must interact 
with one another. In these situations, sophisticated reasoning about the other 
decision-makers’ motivations is required. A simple example is the stag hunt game, 
where two hunters enter a field filled with hares and one stag. Each hunter has to 
individually decide which to hunt for. Taking down the stag yields the highest 
reward for both hunters. The hares are easily caught, but the stag requires two 
hunters to take down. Should both hunters opt to hunt for hares, they each capture 
half of them. If one hunter goes after the stag alone, that hunter will go home 
empty-handed while the other hunter captures all the hares. Situations where one 
player cannot unilaterally improve their outcome by changing their strategy is 
known as a Nash equilibrium. The stag hunt game has two such situations: when 
both hunters opt to hunt for the stag and when both hunters opt to hunt for hares. In 
either of these situations, changing one’s strategy will result in a lesser reward. The 
stag hunt game constitutes a non-zero-sum game, meaning that the gains or losses 
of one player are not equally balanced by the gains or losses of the other players. 
Cooperation can lead to a win-win scenario that is beneficial to both players, in 
contrast to a typical zero-sum game like poker, where the total losses subtracted 
from the total gains always amount to zero. 
  
Another example of a non-zero-sum game is the prisoner’s dilemma, where two 
players acting as prisoners have to decide whether to cooperate and stay silent or 
defect and testify against the other prisoner. Mutual cooperation is most beneficial 
for both players, yielding a minimal prison sentence for each player. If both players 
defect, they both get a harsher sentence than when cooperating. Should however 
one player defect while the other cooperates, the one who defects is released, while 
the cooperating player gets the harshest possible sentence. The original prisoner’s 
dilemma is a one-shot game where the players only play one round. In a one-shot 
game, defection is the best option. An iterated version exists, where multiple 
rounds are played, allowing for other viable strategies. In the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma, players can punish defectors by employing a tit-for-tat strategy where 
they mimic the last move of the opposing player. With an uncertain or infinite 
amount of iterations, mutual cooperation a viable strategy, as any move of 
defection can be remembered by the opposing player. However, if the number of 
iterations is known to the players in advance, defection remains the only 
evolutionarily stable strategy. This is because the optimal strategy for both players 
on the last iteration is defection. This holds true for the next to-last interaction, the 
one before that, and all the way back to the first interaction (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981). 
 
This study investigates the application of a game-theoretical construct called the 
Equality Principle (EP) as a means to increase cooperation between parents in 
custody disputes. 
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1.4 The Equality Principle 
In order to motivate parents to renegotiate the terms of their dispute and potentially 
come to an agreement during negotiation, the Equality Principle was introduced 
(Ngaosuvan, 2018a). Stemming from the application of splitting the difference in 
law and research in the fields of game theory and motivational psychology, this 
principle proposes to utilize the threat of randomization of outcome to promote 
cooperation between parents. The essential benefits of this decision process are 
saving time, reducing child suffering and increasing transparency, fairness and 
reproducibility. The EP can be used to bring about a court decision in a shorter 
amount of time and potentially lead parents to come to an agreement outside of 
court. Child suffering is reduced both by providing predictable housing conditions 
and less exposure to conflict in a shorter amount of time. Another benefit is 
transparency, as the ruling is based on openly available information that cannot be 
skewed in favor of one parent. Fairness is another important factor which the EP 
provides, as investigator biases such as deeming one parent as more likeable cannot 
influence the ruling. Additionally, the EP improves reproducibility of court 
decisions through implementation of the same procedure for all cases in which the 
principle is applicable.  
 
Before applying the EP, a few criteria must be met. No critical information about 
risk for future child maltreatment can be found in the RA and no decisive 
information can be found in the ICBI (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). The second of these 
criteria is difficult as there are no strict guidelines that courts can follow when 
interpreting such factors, which can lead to the splitting of hairs (Ngaosuvan, 
2018a). The EP can be a useful tool in a situation of high conflict that meets the 
aforementioned criteria. The basic EP states that: “If both parents are fit, there are 
no decisive differences in practical aspects, and the conflict between the parents 
rule out shared custody, then courts should flip a coin to decide the winner.” 
(Ngaosuvan, 2018a, p. 586). It is important to note that in this type of litigation, 
what is argued over is the living arrangement and time spent with the children, and 
as such, the basic EP is a form of winner takes all scenario unless otherwise stated. 
This approach is unlikely to lead to more cooperation among the litigating parents, 
but a more advanced version of the basic EP can be used to improve the chances 
for cooperation. 
 
In this advanced version, before a final court decision, parents are prompted to 
offer an amount of visitation time to the other parent. The parent that gives the 
highest offer will win sole custody of the child and the losing parent will be given 
the amount of visitation that was offered by the winner. In the case that both 
parents offer the same amount, the outcome is determined by randomization with 
equal odds for the parents, and the losing parent will get the amount that was 
offered. For example, if parent A offers 30% visitation time, and parent B offers 
20%, parent A is awarded sole custody of the child and parent B is awarded the 
right to 30% visitation time. The offers will be made independently of each other, 
such that parents will have no knowledge of each others offer until both offers have 
been recorded. For the rest of this article, EP refers to this advanced version. The 
EP should promote cooperation between parents behaving rationally, in the sense 
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that each parent is more likely to win the higher amount they offer. At the same 
time, the losing parent benefits more from a winner offering a high amount than a 
low amount. Potentially both parents could offer the same very low amount of 
visitation, in which case the outcome would be determined by randomization. This 
is the biggest weakness of the EP, as presumably such an outcome would not 
promote close and good contact with both parents. This can potentially be adressed 
by further modifying the specific rules of the EP. 
1.5 Emotion, motivation and goal setting 
Emotional distress and adversarial confrontations are central to each parent in a 
custody dispute (Emery, 1999), it is therefore important to mitigate the risks these 
factors impose on the potential resolution of the dispute. One way to reduce the 
damages these factors cause is to employ strategic mediation between the disputing 
parents (Dillon & Emery, 1996), allowing them to see the situation from another 
perspective and hence preferentially increasing their willingness to cooperate. The 
reasoning behind using the EP comes from motivational psychology, specifically 
goal-setting theory. Goal-setting theory describes how task difficulty relates to 
performance, how the setting of goals influence performance, the importance of 
action-causation and the commitment to goals for performance on tasks. 
Specificity, challenge and proximity are three of the most important factors that 
motivate people according to Goal-setting theory. Specificity concerns the case 
where giving a vague description of goals with respect to a certain task will 
produce lower motivation to perform that task than if given a specific description. 
Challenge relates to the difficulty of the task, where the highest level of motivation 
occurs on tasks that are moderately difficult as opposed to very easy or very 
difficult (Latham & Locke, 2002). Regarding proximity, a big and complex 
problem can be broken down into sub-problems which are separated in time and 
are each easier to manage than the larger problem (Latham & Locke, 1991).  
 
The EP makes the decision problem within the custody dispute a specific, proximal 
and moderately challenging problem, and as such might influence the decisions 
made by parents during litigation. The EP introduces a threat directly relating to 
each parent’s propensity to cooperate, as it ties each parent’s offer causally to the 
outcome of the dispute. The aim is that this threat will make parents opt to 
cooperate and come to an agreement in the final talks before the court decision. It 
is important to note that in the present system, litigating parents have no real 
incentive to let their opponent have any visitation time with their child. The 
difference between how disputes are normally settled in court compared to a 
situation in which the EP is applied is that the parents are faced with a final 
decision with highly specific information. As parents gets a final chance to 
influence the outcome of the dispute, they may also be more willing to accept the 
outcome. When a parent loses the dispute, they immediately know the reason, their 
offer was too low. As such, the situation should nudge parents to act more 
rationally, according to how they need to act in order to reach their goal. It might 
potentially alter their goal if the threat of the EP is high enough that it warrants a 
renegotiation of the terms where one or both parties might alter their stance. In the 
present system numerous custody disputes are resolved between parents just before 
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a court decision (Swedish National Courts Administration, 2018; Ngaosuvan, 
2018a), as courts’ decision-making can seem arbitrary and intimidating. If parents 
are not certain of the outcome they might try to renegotiate and come to terms 
before the court makes its ruling. The EP can potentially act as a trigger for this 
phenomenon, making it apparent for parents earlier in talks that the court decision 
could come to be based upon offered visitation or randomization, effectively 
motivating parents to come to terms during litigation.  
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether the EP can be used to facilitate 
cooperation between parents. In order to address this question, the following 
hypothesis was formulated: People will be more cooperative in a decision scenario 
based on the EP than in a decision scenario based on the present system.  
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2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 52 Swedish speaking adults (26 men and 26 women). 
Participants were recruited through social media, advertising boards, pamphlets and 
various Swedish online forums. The mean age for participants in the study was 
34.0 (SD = 12.2), with ages ranging from 22 to 70 years. 
2.2 Materials 
 
In this study, an online vignette experiment was conducted. Vignettes were used 
because of the necessity to evoke the same type of negative emotional states that 
are common in custody disputes. The study included an introductory text 
containing general information about Swedish law in relation to custody disputes, 
along with some information about outcomes and considerations. Two vignettes 
were developed for this study, referred to as favor mother and favor father. The 
vignettes were identical but for the fact that names and pronouns were switched 
such that the story told in the vignette could be interpreted in favor of either the 
father or the mother, depending on the gender of the participant. The vignette 
contained a short story about an ongoing custody dispute between a man - woman 
ex couple. The favor mother vignette promoted negative aspects of the father and 
positive aspects of the mother, and vice versa for the favor father vignette. The 
vignettes also contained neutral information regarding the facts of the situation 
from the family court’s perspective and ended with the parents’ own attitudes 
regarding one another being voiced. Two decision scenarios were created, one 
instantiating the present system and the other based on the EP. Furthermore, 
questions concerning participants’ knowledge, experience and various opinions of 
the subject were included. All material responded to by participants in this study 
were presented in Swedish. 
 
2.2.1 Vignette 
Several statements regarding the previous relationship between the parents, their 
actions, behaviors and traits were incorporated into a story consisting of three 
paragraphs with varying focus. In the first paragraph the circumstances regarding 
this particular custody dispute was established. After that introduction several 
statements were presented showing how one parent had betrayed the other for 
many years, having an affair and using the other parents’ funds to visit hotels and 
travel with a secret partner. The unfaithful parent is also shown to have accused the 
other parent of assault, of which no evidence has been found. Furthermore, several 
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petty accusations have been filed with the authorities by the unfaithful parent, 
showing that he/she is prone to overreaction and unwilling to cooperate. 
 
The second paragraph is designed to show the family court’s interpretation of the 
situation, and in sum they decide that the accusations of the unfaithful parent do not 
hold up as evidence to declare the other parent unfit for custody. The family court 
decides that neither the infidelity nor the alleged assault is relevant in the 
consideration of the children's best interest. Furthermore, it is explained that the 
conflict itself is becoming harmful for the children. Since the parents can’t settle 
the dispute with negotiation, the family court will have to decide which parent 
should be given custody of the children. 
 
In the final paragraph it is reiterated that the situation is unbearable for the parents 
and children alike, and that the situation seems to get worse because of the 
uncertainty of not knowing when and how it is going to end. The parent’s attitudes 
toward each other is voiced in this paragraph. By voicing positive aspects of their 
own behavior and situation, and raising negative aspects of the other parent, each 
parent tries to influence the custody evaluators into making a recommendation in 
their favor. 
 
2.2.2 Decision scenarios 
2.2.2.1 EP 
In the decision scenario based on the EP, the participant is presented with the 
information that unless the parents can come to an agreement, the family court will 
have to decide who should be awarded custody. It is stated that the risk assessment 
conducted by the custody evaluators found neither of the parents to be unfit for 
custody, neither have they found any decisive differences regarding what is in the 
children's best interest. However, since the prolonged conflict between the parents 
is deemed harmful for the children, sole custody will be awarded to one of the 
parents. Further, it is stated that the final decision will be based on the amount of 
visitation that each parent would be willing to offer the other in the case he or she 
wins the custody dispute. The parent offering the highest amount would therefore 
win the dispute unless both parents offer the same amount, in which case 
randomization would determine the outcome, with the offered amount being given 
to the losing parent. 
 
2.2.2.2 PM 
The decision scenario based on the present system contains the same information 
as the EP scenario regarding the risk assessment, children’s best interest and the 
harmful conflict. The main difference between the decision scenarios concerns the 
information regarding the family court’s decision. In the present model, the only 
information given about the decision is that the family court is very likely to award 
one of the parents with sole custody. 
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2.2.3 Measures 
Two types of decision scenarios were included as independent variables in the 
experiment, the present model (PM) and the equality principle (EP). The PM was 
an instantiation of a decision scenario based on how recommendations and rulings 
are currently being made and the EP was a decision scenario based on the Equality 
Principle. As a measure of cooperation, the dependent variable, visitation 
generosity, was defined as the amount of visitation time offered by participants in 
response to each decision scenario. Visitation generosity was measured in percent 
of time, ranging from 0 to 50%. The study included ratings of parental aptitude, 
measured on a 1 to 7 scale, on which 7 represented a parent completely fit for 
custody. A measure of participants experience of custody disputes was included, 
defined as either having been involved in a custody dispute or being close to 
someone who has been involved in a custody dispute. 
 
2.3 Design & Procedure 
This study comprised a simple within-subjects design experiment. The experiment 
was conducted online. Participants who agreed to partake in the study were 
instructed to proceed to a link where they would sign informed consent. General 
information such as gender and age were gathered from participants as well as 
information concerning their knowledge, experience and opinion of custody 
disputes and family law. After responding to the initial questions each participant 
received the introductory text and the vignette favoring the parent corresponding to 
their own gender. After reading the vignette the participants were asked to respond 
to multiple questions regarding the vignette. Participants were then asked to read 
and respond to two decision scenarios. One decision scenario represented a 
traditional decision process, instantiating the present system. The other was based 
on the EP. The order of presentation of the decision scenarios were randomized 
with equal numbers of participants receiving each of the two possible orders. The 
participants were then asked a few follow-up questions regarding the credibility of 
the scenario they had read, model preference and their previous knowledge of the 
EP. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Main hypothesis 
The mean visitation generosity was 39.38 (SD = 11.83, 95% CI [34.82, 44.34]) in 
the EP condition and 33.92 (SD = 14.23, 95% CI [28.97, 38.49]) in the PM 
condition. The number of participants with the highest possible visitation 
generosity (50%) was 22 in the EP condition and 18 in the PM condition. Levene’s 
Test of Equality of Error Variances yielded a statistically significant result within 
the EP condition, F (1, 50) = 4.40, p < .05. A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test was 
performed, which showed a statistically significant difference between the means, 
Z = 3.712, p < .05. 
3.2 Internal validity 
The mean rating of parental aptitude for the parent of the same gender as the 
participant was 5.88 (SD = 0.95) for men and 5.65 (SD = 1.29) for women. The 
mean rating of parental aptitude for the opposite gender parent was 3.15 (SD = 
1.51) for men and 3.92 (SD = 1.67) for women. A Mann-Whitney U test was 
conducted to determine the difference between genders in perceived parental 
aptitude of the parents presented in the vignette. There was no statistically 
significant difference between men and women in perceived aptitude of the parent 
presented as the same gender as the participants U = 315, p = .661, nor was there a 
statistically significant difference between men and women in perceived aptitude of 
the parent presented as the opposite gender of the participants U = 246, p = .086. 
The mean rating of perceived parental aptitude across participants for the parent 
presented as the same gender was 5.77 (SD = 1.63) and the mean rating for the 
parent presented as the opposite gender was 3.54 (SD = 1.13). A Wilcoxon Signed-
Ranks Test showed a statistically significant difference between the mean ratings 
of the parents presented in the vignette, Z = .540, p < .05.  
 
There were 26 participants who had experience of custody disputes. The mean 
visitation generosity for participants with experience was 37.46 (SD = 13.40) in the 
EP condition and 32.23 (SD = 15.16) in the PM condition. For participants without 
experience the mean visitation generosity was 41.31 (SD = 9.92) in the EP 
condition and 35.62 (SD = 13.32) in the PM condition. No statistically significant 
difference was found between the groups in the experience factor, indicating that 
the data does not show that experience of custody disputes was a confounding 
factor. 
 
No other factors in this study yielded statistically significant results. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 General discussion 
The EP is a theoretical construct based on game theory and motivational 
psychology (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). This article provides empirical evidence that the 
combination of game theory (Myerson, 1997) and goal-setting theory (Locke & 
Latham, 1991) affect participants’ cooperation. The results of this study support the 
hypothesis that people will be more cooperative in a decision scenario based on the 
EP than in a decision scenario based on the present system. The goal of any 
mediation model used in custody disputes should be to increase cooperation 
between litigating parents. Hopefully, the benefits of this model extend beyond 
more evenly distributing children’s time spent with each parent. When parents are 
deemed equally fit in the present system, custody evaluators are left to look for 
small differences - splitting hairs (Ngaosuvan, 2018a). Social workers, like all 
humans, are susceptible to bias (Sagi & Dvir, 1993). The EP can steer away from 
any value judgments by removing bias from the equation. Additionally, the EP may 
lead to less suffering as it can greatly reduce the time children have to spend living 
in uncertainty. The EP can save both courts and litigating parents money as no time 
needs to be wasted on circumstances of little significance to the child’s best 
interest. With a successful implementation of the EP, cooperation will presumably 
come to be understood by the general public as a good strategy for winning custody 
disputes. It is not unreasonable to assume then, that with time, cooperation might 
be increased further than these results suggest. Should its use become widespread, 
it is possible that people would negotiate themselves to avoid the risk of 
randomization introduced by the EP. For instance, this may happen if their advisors 
would tell them that there is no chance that the court would find any involved 
parent as unfit. 
 
The results of this study did not show any statistically significant difference in 
which model participants preferred when asked to rate to what extent they thought 
each model should be used in custody disputes. This shows a potential discrepancy 
between their stated preference and how much visitation was offered. Multiple 
explanations are possible. One possibility is that there is a belief that the present 
system should suffice in determining which parent is more fit, that there must be 
some dividing factor not yet found by the investigation. This of course, leads to the 
splitting of hairs. Another possible explanation is the transparency offered by the 
EP. When losing custody under the present system, there are infinitely many 
reasons one could come up with to explain the outcome as having nothing to do 
with one's own behavior and actions. With the EP, any such reasons are easily 
discounted. This transparency, however, is desirable as it becomes objectively clear 
what determined the outcome of any such custody dispute. Furthermore, 
transparency should reduce the number of re-litigations as claims of unfair rulings 
will be easily dismissed. 
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One obvious weakness of this study concerns ecological validity. It is very difficult 
to introduce the emotional and adversarial nature of a custody dispute in an 
experimental setting. The necessity to evoke the same type of negative emotional 
states that are common in custody disputes prompted the use of a vignette as a 
means for gathering data. Even so, roughly one third of participants offered the 
maximum amount of visitation in both conditions. This may indicate that the 
vignette did not sufficiently evoke the degree of negative emotions commonly felt 
by litigating parents, as inability to cooperate is the reason there is a custody 
dispute to begin with. However, as shown by participants’ rating of parental 
aptitude, the vignette was successful in producing negative valence toward the 
parent of the opposite gender. This was further strengthened by subjective ratings 
of the credibility of the vignette. Had this not been the case, it could have been a 
threat to the internal validity of the study. 
  
A possible limitation of using an economic model for decision scenarios is that 
observed behavior usually does not line up with the models’ predictions. When 
decision makers are predicted to act selfishly and rationally, they generally are less 
selfish and strategic than the model predicts. This may be due to social factors such 
as reciprocity and equity (Sanfey, 2007). This should not be an issue for the present 
study, however, as reciprocity and equity could only lead to more cooperation. 
Furthermore, equity could be the reason for the high visitation generosity in the PM 
condition. In a high-intensity parental conflict, equity is unlikely to be a motivating 
factor, and so visitation offered in a real case might be much lower than in the PM 
condition. It is also possible for players to be motivated by punishing their 
adversary in a game-theoretical decision scenario. This has been illustrated in a 
trust game, where players have been shown to derive satisfaction in punishing non-
reciprocators, even when this resulted in a loss to themselves (Sanfey, 2007).  
 
The only way to exhibit punishing behavior in the present framework is to make a 
very low offer, in which case the probability of winning the dispute is very low. 
This would only result in victory if the other parent makes an even lower offer. 
However, this situation seems very unlikely, particularly if the motivating aspects 
of the EP are high. The result of this study indicates that the EP would lead to 
increased offers for both parents as compared to the present system. The potential 
problem of both parents offering very low amounts could be mitigated in various 
ways. One way of mitigating the problem could be to decide a lowest allowed 
offer, e.g. 25%. If the winning parent offers only 7%, the court decides to offer no 
less than 25% visitation time to the losing parent. The more generous parent will be 
awarded sole custody but the losing parent will get the court mandated lowest 
amount of visitation. This is just one example of how the problem could be 
adressed, but presumably there could be even better alternatives. More research and 
consideration is needed on this front. 
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4.2 Gender differences 
It is interesting to note that gender was not shown to affect visitation generosity in 
either condition. Coupled with the fact that no difference was found between 
genders in perceived parental aptitude, this is very promising for the EP. This 
means that according to the results of this study, the EP works equally well on both 
men and women. This lends credence to the fairness aspect of the EP, as it is not 
shown to be favorable for one gender. 
4.3 Clinical significance 
In terms of measurable outcome, the results may not seem to be of major clinical 
significance, as the amount of visitation divided among the parents is similar in the 
two conditions. However, as the goal of the EP is to maximize visitation 
generosity, we argue that there is a clinical significance to these results. In the EP 
condition, 4 more participants offered the maximum amount of visitation than in 
the PM condition. For at least four children, this means spending half their time 
with each parent instead of what would have been offered if the EP had not been 
used. Furthermore, when parents cooperate and reach an agreement about evenly 
distributed time with a child, the risk for re-litigation should be low. 
4.4 The need for evidence-based practices 
Every three years, The National Board of Health and Welfare (2017) conducts an 
investigation aimed at randomly selected operations managers within individual 
and family care as well as disability and elderly care. They are asked questions 
about standardized assessment methods and ventures of evidence-based practices. 
In 2016, 75% of the responding operations managers claimed to have an interest in 
evidence-based practices. However, only 6% of those managers stated that their co-
workers had enough knowledge of how to evaluate the quality of evidence. When 
asked about what was deemed very important when it comes to implementing 
evidence-based practices, the most common response, stated by 59% of 
respondents, was a clear recommendation from state authorities. Clear 
recommendations from various research institutes were deemed very important 
only by 15-23% of respondents, depending on which research institute issued the 
recommendation (The National Board of Health and Welfare, 2017). It is safe to 
say then, that the implementation of new procedures is more likely to come from 
state recommendations than any academic entity. However, for any such 
recommendation to ever be issued with regards to the implementation of the EP, 
clear and concise evidence supporting the EP must be made be available. 
4.5 Further research 
We encourage more studies in the subject to further test the EP in relation to 
traditional decision making in family law. There are ways to modify the EP to 
potentially further increase the amount of visitation offered by each parent. If both 
parents offer an equal amount, and that amount is less than 50 percent, parents 
could be prompted to make a new offer instead of randomizing at this point.  
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This approach can be likened to the iterated prisoners dilemma, as the parents are 
provided with new information before making their next offer. Since this new 
round of offering only occurs when both parents have offered the same amount, the 
information they gain is that their adversary is just as generous as they are. This 
information can serve multiple functions. Either as a threat, as you now know that 
your adversary is prepared to offer at least as much as you are, and you could easily 
lose if you do not increase you offer substantially. Or it can function as a token of 
good faith and cooperation, as you know they are willing to grant you the same 
amount of visitation as you granted them. In the trust game, players are predicted to 
betray one another but often choose to reciprocate (Sanfey, 2007). Increased 
generosity through reciprocation would indeed not go against the predictions of this 
instantiation of game theory, rather, it would conform to them. 
 
Either way, another round of offers could only increase the amount of offered 
visitation. Further threat could be introduced by informing the parents that this will 
be the final offer even if both parents offer equal amounts again. This could 
potentially drive parents toward an even higher offer. Of course, this could also be 
set up so that new offers are requested each time parents offer equal amounts, until 
one parent offers more than the other, or the amount offered by both parents have 
reached 50 percent. If both parents are willing to offer 50 percent, then presumably 
they should be able to come to an agreement of shared custody and settle out of 
court. If either parent is unwilling to agree to shared custody, the court will have to 
settle the matter by randomization and contractually bind the parents to their 
obligations regarding the child’s custody. Such a contract could be used to make 
sure that the parent with sole custody cannot legally move and bring the child to a 
new location unreasonably far from the current home. The contract could also 
legally prevent one parent from withholding information regarding the child’s 
health, school results or in other ways make it difficult for the other parent to have 
a good and close contact with the child. 
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5 Conclusions 
This study has provided experimental evidence that the EP works as a means to 
increase cooperation. The implementation of the EP as a motivational tool in 
custody disputes show much promise and should therefore be a real consideration. 
The combination of game theory and goal-setting theory is an appropriate approach 
when trying to increase parental motivation to cooperate within the context of a 
custody dispute. We believe the results provided in this article to further build on 
the foundation established in this subject and can serve to guide future studies. 
Furthermore, the EP is shown to work regardless of gender or previous experience 
with custody disputes. This is a very important point, as the EP needs to be 
applicable in any situation where both parents are considered fit for custody.
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Vignette 
Pernilla och Tommy befinner sig i en långdragen och kostsam vårdnadstvist. De kan inte 
komma överens om vårdnaden av sina två barn och Pernilla stämmer Tommy för enskild 
vårdnad. Anledningen till osämjan mellan föräldrarna är att Pernilla varit otrogen mot Tommy 
under flera års tid. Pernilla har dessutom utnyttjat Tommy ekonomiskt genom att använda 
gemensamma resurser till privata angelägenheter som hotellvistelser, resor och middagar med 
sin hemliga partner. Hon har ljugit om gamla skulder och maskerat sina privata nöjen som 
arbetsrelaterade resor, och på så vis lurat Tommy att betala för aktiviteter i samband med 
Pernillas möten med sin hemliga partner. Sedan parets separation har Pernilla flyttat ihop med 
sin nya partner. Innan parets separation polisanmäldes Tommy av Pernilla för misshandel i 
hemmet i samband med deras bråk om otroheten. Tommy skall ha kastat en tallrik i väggen 
och skrikit åt Pernilla vilket resulterade i att hon kände sig väldigt rädd. Tommy medger att 
han blev arg, men nekar anklagelsen om misshandeln då han aldrig rörde Pernilla. Pernilla har 
sedan parets separation polisanmält Tommy vid fler tillfällen, i anslutning med att han varit 
försenad med att lämna barnen hos henne. Hon har även gjort orosanmälningar hos 
socialtjänsten då Tommy varit några minuter sen att hämta barnen i skolan.1 
 
Det är familjerättens bedömning att båda föräldrarna är lika lämpliga vårdnadshavare sett till 
både risker och att skillnaderna i barnens bästa intressen är försumbara. Familjerätten vill 
också berömma båda föräldrarna för att de inte blandat in barnen i konflikten. Familjerätten 
menar att Pernillas anmälan om misshandel saknar grund då den påstådda misshandeln bara 
inträffat vid ett tillfälle, och inte heller fyller kraven för misshandel då inget fysiskt våld 
utövats. Det är alltså enbart föräldrarnas oförmåga att komma överens som leder till att 
vårdnadstvisten inte kan lösas med samarbetssamtal. På grund av att familjerätten anser att 
den fortsatta konflikten mellan föräldrarna är skadlig för barnen bedömer familjerätten att det 
är i barnens bästa intresse att ge den ena föräldern enskild vårdnad med rätt till umgänge för 
den andra föräldern. 
 
Livssituationen är påfrestande både för barn och föräldrar. Det är framförallt barnen som 
drabbas och blir lidande ju mer tid som går i ovisshet. Pernilla uttrycker att hennes nya 
partner är den enda pappan barnen behöver, och att Tommy därför inte behöver finnas med i 
bilden. Tommy anser att Pernillas låga inkomst och det faktum att hon får förlita sig på sin 
nya partners ekonomi är en otrygghet för barnen. Tommy uttrycker att Pernilla är manipulativ 
och egoistisk och därför är en olämplig förälder. Av denna anledning anser Tommy att han 
borde ha fördel i familjerättens beslut. Han uttrycker även att han bryr sig mer om barnen då 
han spenderar mer tid med dem, lagar mat åt dem och hjälper till mer med läxor än vad 
Pernilla gör. 
                                                 
1 The vignette were presented in Swedish. The names and pronouns used in the vignette were switched such that 
the vignette favoring the mother were presented to women, and vice versa for men. 
  
 
7.2 Decision scenarios 
7.2.1 Present Model 
Om de tvistande föräldrarna inte kan komma överens i det sista avgörande samtalet kommer 
det att vara upp till familjerätten att fatta ett beslut grundat på en samlad bedömning baserad 
på barnens bästa intresse. Familjerätten meddelar att ingen av föräldrarna bedömts vara 
olämplig i riskbedömningen och att skillnaderna mellan föräldrarnas situationer sett till 
barnens bästa är försumbara. Eftersom konflikten mellan föräldrarna anses skadlig för barnen 
så kommer beslut om enskild vårdnad att fattas. Med största sannolikhet kommer det att 
innebära att en förälder kommer att tilldelas vårdnaden och den andra kommer att få ett 
begränsat umgänge. 2 
7.2.2 Equality Principle 
Ifall de tvistande föräldrarna inte kan komma överens i det sista avgörande samtalet kommer 
det att vara upp till familjerätten att fatta ett beslut om vårdnaden av barnen. Familjerätten 
meddelar att ingen av föräldrarna bedömts vara olämplig i riskbedömningen och att 
skillnaderna mellan föräldrarnas situationer sett till barnens bästa är försumbara. Eftersom 
konflikten mellan föräldrarna anses skadlig för barnen så kommer beslut om enskild vårdnad 
att fattas. 
 
Familjerätten kommer att tilldela vårdnaden till den förälder som erbjuder mest umgänge till 
den andre föräldern. Den förälder som gett ett lägre bud får så mycket umgänge som den 
högstbjudande föräldern erbjudit. Båda föräldrar får ge sina bud samtidigt, utan att känna till 
den andres bud. Ifall båda föräldrarna skulle erbjuda lika mycket tid så kommer beslutet om 
vårdnaden att slumpas, med lika stor vinstchans för båda föräldrarna.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The decision scenarios were presented in Swedish. 
  
7.3 Questions 
 
Table 1 
General questions asked in the study. 
Questions  
Have you been involved in a custody dispute? 
   
Do you have an acquaintance that has been involved in a 
custody dispute? 
   
If you have responded yes to any of the above questions, 
is the custody dispute ongoing? 
   
Do you have general knowledge of family law regarding 
custody, living and visitation rights? 
   
How high is your confidence in the family court’s 
decision making? 
   
*Opposing gender parent’s emotional betrayal is one of 
the most hurtful things one could subject one’s partner to. 
   
*Opposing gender parent’s economic deceit is one of the 
most hurtful things one could subject one’s partner to. 
   
*Opposing gender parent is a fit parent    
*Own gender parent is a fit parent    
Did you perceive the story as realistic?    
To what extent should the following model be used in 
courts’ decision making? (PM / EP) 
   
 
Table 2 
Experimental questions asked in the study. 
Question asked after presentation of each experimental 
decision scenario 
If you were own gender parent* in the stated decision 
scenario, how much visitation would you offer the 
opposing parent*? 
* In the study, questions were stated with the name of the parent represented in the vignette, 
which varied depending on the gender of the participant.3 
                                                 
3 The questions were stated in Swedish and have been translated for this article. 
